Congress and Cloning: A brief lesson in how not to
make policy
J. Burley, Exeter College, University of Oxford
Charles
Darwin apparently once spent an entire week repeating to himself: "I will
not draw back when the snake in the reptile house strikes at me from behind the
glass." Darwin then visited the zoo, but his concerted attempt to control
his actual response to the creature, failed. The snake struck, Darwin recoiled.In like spirit of investigation, I decided to wait before reading the
recent USA Congressional debate on H.R. 2505 'Human Cloning Prohibition Act of
2001'.Although in this case,
intellect not instinct would be the trigger to my reaction, it was bound to be a
sharp one. One week passed. The inevitable transpired. Although I had repeatedly
told myself that policy-making over genetic developments wasn't all that bad,
the conclusion that it really is, ultimately proved inescapable.
The House
of Representatives passed Bill 2505 by a vote of 265-162, on July 31st of this
year. One disillusioned participant aptly described the debate as a "papal
event" and, as such, he suspected it was "unconstitutional"(page
H4922). There may be some truth to this, but what is truly striking about the
passage of Bill 2505 is just how confused some policy-makers seemed to have been
about what was at stake, and why. Perhaps the climate of confusion was
strategically induced - often the default position of those who lack
understanding is: 'Just say no!' Whatever the reason, the debate result is, at
best unfortunate. At worst, it is irresponsible and has far-reaching moral
implications.
Bill 2505
moved on to the US Senate, having been 'engrossed' in the House in the sweeping
form that is was introduced - no significant amendments were made, and the
'Greenwood-Deutsch substitute', which distinguished between reproductive and
therapeutic cloning, was rejected. Section 2 of the Bill makes it unlawful for
anyone in the public or private sectors to:attempt or assist in an attempt to produce a human embryo using somatic
cell nuclear transfer; ship or receive an embryo so made and/or products derived
from it; and, import any cloned human embryo (page H4917).
Many
arguments were advanced in the Congressional debate in favour of Bill 2505. The
strongest one against human reproductive cloning concerned the predicted ill
health of the cloned child. In cloning studies of non-human animals, there is a
high incidence of both unique and severe abnormalities, some of which appear
only late in fetal life and/or in infancy.Therefore, it was argued, it would be immoral to attempt human cloning.
Is it morally correct to seek to prevent serious harm to future people? Maybe
so, but, while the argument under scrutiny, premised on the prediction that
cloned children will suffer horrible deformities, provides grounds for a moratorium
on human cloning, it does not support a ban. What has been ignored by
members of Congress, the pioneers of mammalian cloning, scientists involved in
stem cell research, and the wider public, is that this very same argument, the
weight of which rests on the notion of harm, would support human cloning
were it ever demonstrable in animal models that a high rate of efficiency
could be achieved.Indeed,
according to the logic of their argument against human cloning, one day it could
be thought immoral not to clone a child. This is because if
cloning ever became highly efficient, it would have a distinct advantage over
natural procreation: cloning could avoid the mental and physical defects
that occur in 'natural' procreation because the impact of the particular genetic
composition of the cloned individual can be predicted, to an extent, through
knowledge of the life history of the adult cell donor. If our only objection to
human cloning rests on the premise that cloned infants would have terrible
health problems, and that premise ever proves false, not only does our objection
to cloning disappear, the rationale for the objection - protecting the health of
future children - could be applied to the case of natural procreation. We know
that some children born through natural means are afflicted by disease and
deformity. If human cloning was to circumvent these health defects, should it
not become the method of choice?The problem with the line of reasoning employed by some of
the USA policy-makers is that it suggests an affirmative answer here.
Notwithstanding the fact that no one realised this to be the logical extension
of their anti-cloning argument, it is regrettable that policy over cloning was
arrived at in this way.
Moreover,
most of the objectors to human cloning failed to recognise that if predicted
abnormality is a strong enough reason to support a ban on human cloning now, it
should also be a strong enough reason to support a current ban on some acts of
natural procreation, i.e., whenever there is a high risk of a future child
suffering dreadful deformity or disease. For if it is the physical and mental
welfare of the cloned child that commands our moral attention, why shouldn't the
well-being of children conceived through natural means also exercise us morally?
Thus the
USA policy-makers have unwittingly deployed an argument against human cloning
that might well support its practice in the future. In addition, if
consistency is a reasonable expectation of the policy process, the logic behind
Bill 2505 effectively condemns any person now who takes high risks with the
health of any future child.
The Bill
outlaws not only human reproductive cloning but also research on embryos
produced by somatic cell nuclear transfer, thereby closing off one avenue of
stem cell research, at least for the time being. The main anticipated benefit of
therapeutic cloning would be the cultivation of immortal stem cell lines,
immunologically compatible with the patient. However, since human stem cell
research is still very much in its infancy, therapeutic cloning is not currently
thought to offer any significant advantage to US stem cell researchers who
legally already can make use of embryos derived from other sources (though not
with public funding).Whilst
clinical applications which might require histocompatible products are some way
off, no robust arguments were advanced against therapeutic cloning in the debate
over Bill 2505,just more sloppy thinking.
As in
discussion over abortion, the moral status of the embryo was the chief
preoccupation of some policy-makers. It was argued that all embryos are
potential people from the moment of conception, and therefore merit legal
protections. In the name of morality, the blastocyst was given a weightier moral
status than that of existing human beings who suffer great hardship from injury
or disease, and who might benefit from therapeutic cloning-related research.
This defies common sense.
That
observation aside, let us scrutinise the notion that embryos are potential
people.
How can x
be a potential y if the conditions required for the transition from x to y do
not obtain? In the case of natural procreation, many embryos die owing to
chromosomal abnormalities. We are told that a potential person becomes such at
conception. But these embryos could never have become a person because they
lacked the requisite genetic complement to survive. Similarly, if we never
intend to plant an acorn, instead we will feed it to the birds, we cannot say
sensibly that the acorn was a potential oak tree. It was nothing more (nor
anything less) than an acorn. The point is that potentiality is necessarily a contingent
concept. A blastocyst created, and then destroyed by a stem cell researcher
would always have been intended for research and/or clinical uses. Thus, from
the outset, there was no possibility of the blastocyst becoming, e.g., John
Smith, because there was never any intention of providing it with the correct
nurturing environment.
The
potentiality argument advanced by some members of Congress - incorporating the
view that life begins at conception - were it followed to its logical
conclusions, denies the moral permissibility of women using intrauterine devices
for birth control, in vitro fertilisation, and abortion. Perversely, it also
implies that natural procreation is morally problematic! We now know
that, on average, approximately three to four human conceptuses die before one
survives to the fetal stage. When we make the choice to procreate naturally in
the light of knowledge about this attrition rate, are we not guilty of the
manslaughter of one or more potential people?I wonder how the American people would react were they to realise that
what they do, as a matter of course, has, by implication, just been morally
condemned by Congress, and that many sexually active citizens of reproductive
age could be considered criminals of a kind. In short, it is a nonsense to talk
of blastocysts intended for research as being potential people, just as
it is a nonsense to speak of defective embryos - ones which lack the physical
integrity to survive - as potential people. In both cases, the conditions
required for the x to become a y are not satisfied.
In
conclusion, let us revisit the anecdote offered by Charles Darwin, above.
Darwin's modest experiment was designed to provide some evidence for the
existence of the basic emotion of fear. No matter how hard he tried, Darwin
could not suppress his innate reaction to the snake at the zoo - even the
mediation of reason failed to help him.It
is, I think, fair to say that opposition to human cloning has been of the
knee-jerk kind. Unlike in Darwin's experiment, however, reason can
mediate our reactions to cloning. What we want to escape is bad reasoning.If there is anything to be drawn by German policy-makers from the recent
Congressional debate, it is the message that it does matter how
legislation is argued for, and subsequently framed. In an age where science
promises so much, it is embarrassing, to say the very least, that our thinking
on matters moral, lacks sophistication. German policy-makers shoulder the burden
of a distinctive recent past. For this reason alone, it is important that they
do not unwittingly commit themselves to the anti-reproductive cloning and
anti-therapeutic cloning positions embraced by their US counterparts.
To be sure, human reproductive cloning is not an
attractive prospect at present. But the way in which we argue the case is of
crucial importance. Therapeutic cloning, which should be sharply distinguished
from attempts to 'copy' the genomes of people, offers only benefits to science
and society. On this last
point, the US Congress might find the United Kingdom's legislation instructive.
